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A Friendly Letter to the Oregon
Supreme Court: Let’s Try Again
on the Parol Evidence Rule
The purpose of this article is . . . to show that the [parol
evidence] rule has not been an aid but a positive menace to
the due administration of justice . . . .
—U of O Law School Dean William Hale (1925)1
* Kaapcke Professor of Law, University of Oregon Law School.  Student and
friend Matthew Jaksa provided valuable research help.
1 William G. Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule , 4 OR. L. REV. 91 (1925).  Dean Hale
concluded his colorful indictment of the rule by stating, “The avowed purpose of the
parol evidence rule was to bring . . . certainty into business transactions.  The prom-
ise was appealing; the fulfillment appalling.  We were promised bread.  We received
a stone.  The parol evidence rule is a delusion and a snare.” Id.  at 120; see also infra
text accompanying notes 38 and 43.
[369]
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My Dear Justices:
I hope you will not think too impertinent the title, salu-
tation, and somewhat personal tone of this brief essay.  I truly do
consider it more a friendly letter to esteemed colleagues than a
typically impersonal, exhaustive law review article.  I’m publish-
ing it in our law review, as well as mailing it privately to Your
Honors, only because (1) publishing such essays is part of my job,
and (2) someday, somewhere, a reader other than yourselves
might find it useful.  Perhaps even interesting.
I write to you about the “dreaded parol evidence rule”2 in con-
tract law.  James Bradley Thayer was surely correct a century ago
when he wrote that few things in law are “darker than this, or
fuller of subtle difficulties.”3  Certainly no casebook section be-
devils my students and me more thoroughly each year; and, judg-
ing by reported decisions at least, no contract-law issue vexes
more persistently a great many Oregon attorneys and judges.
I write to suggest to Your Honors, with the greatest respect,
that at the next reasonable opportunity you consider “softening”
the parol evidence rule in our state.4  A softer, less restrictive
rule would contribute, I believe, both to (1) greater certainty re-
garding the rule, for bench and bar alike, and (2) more justice in
contract litigation, through closer judicial attention to contracting
2 Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty:  Plain Meaning and the Parol Evidence
Rule , 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 799 (2002).
3 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 390 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1969) (1898).  Dean Wigmore con-
curred a generation later, calling the parol evidence rule the “most discouraging
subject in the whole field of evidence.”  5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN  SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2400,
at 235-36 (2d ed. 1923).  More recent scholars and judges have expressed similar
frustrations as well. E.g. , Justin Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence:  Diag-
nosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule , 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1968) (the rule
is a “maze of conflicting tests, subrules, and exceptions adversely affecting both the
counseling of clients and the litigation process”); Chase Manhattan Bank v. First
Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971) (the rule resembles a “treacherous
bog in the field of contract law”).
4 The University of Chicago’s Eric Posner has categorized various parol evidence
rule formulations and applications as either “hard” (tending to exclude parol) or
“soft” (tending to admit it).  Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation , 146 U. PA. L. REV.
533, 534 (1998).  The foremost academic advocate of a “hard” rule, naturally, was
Samuel Williston, while the leading champion of a “soft” rule was Arthur Corbin.
See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 631-
650 (1920); 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573-596 (2d ed.
1960).
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parties’ true ex ante  understandings.5  Let’s see if I can convince
you.
One preliminary matter.  I write here only about the parol evi-
dence rule, not  about the related but distinct question whether
so-called “extrinsic evidence” should be admitted to help inter-
pret a written term.  Both courts and commentators rather fre-
quently collapse these two questions into one, but I join my hero
Professor Corbin and others in believing that they are and should
remain separate and distinct.6  The parol evidence rule deter-
mines whether a party may add  a term to a written contract
(such as a lessor’s oral assurance that the lessee will have an ex-
clusive right to sell soft drinks in the building);7 the “extrinsic
evidence” question is whether evidence outside a writing’s four
corners is admissible to help interpret  a term in the writing itself
(such as evidence of what the parties meant by the term “residen-
tial purposes”).8  The Second Restatement, most courts, and
most commentators agree that, whether one labels interpretive
evidence as “parol” or “extrinsic,” the parol evidence rule prop-
5 Sorry, but it’s just not a Contracts essay these days without at least one reference
to “ex ante .”
6 “The ‘parol evidence rule’ is not, and does not purport to be, a rule of interpre-
tation or a rule as to the admission of evidence for the purpose of interpretation.”
CORBIN, supra  note 4, at 412-13.  Professor John Murray agrees, noting that the
“failure to distinguish between the parol evidence rule on the one hand and inter-
pretation on the other” is a “significant cause of confusion.”  John E. Murray, Jr.,
The Parol Evidence Rule:  A Clarification , 4 DUQ. L. REV. 337, 343 (1966); see also
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.3, at 426 (4th ed. 2004) (“[T]he rule does
not exclude evidence offered to help interpret the language of the writing.”).  Ad-
mittedly, the line between adding and interpreting blurs a bit at times, especially
when the parol asserted is some sort of “private code.” See infra  notes 71-76 and
accompanying text.
7 See  Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 126 A. 791 (Pa. 1924).
8 See  Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or. 358, 937 P.2d 1019 (1997).  Oregon law on this
second, interpretation issue is somewhat unclear as well.  In Abercrombie v. Hayden
Corp. , 320 Or. 279, 292, 883 P.2d 845, 853 (1994), the court declared “parol and
other extrinsic evidence” admissible to help determine whether written contract lan-
guage is ambiguous.  Three years later, however, the Yogman  opinion directed that
that “ambiguity” issue be resolved from the disputed text itself, i.e., from the “four
corners of a written contract.”  325 Or. at 361, 937 P.2d at 1021 (quoting Eagle In-
dus., Inc. v. Thompson, 321 Or. 398, 404, 900 P.2d 475, 479 (1995)).  Post-Yogman
Court of Appeals panels have split on the question. Compare  Oregon Trail Elec.
Consumers Co-op., Inc. v. Co-Gen Co., 168 Or. App. 466, 7 P.3d 594 (2000) (admit-
ting extrinsic evidence, citing Abercrombie), with  Cornelius Manor Trailer Court,
Inc. v. Esch, 191 Or. App. 204, 209, 81 P.3d 727 (2003) (stating “if, but only if, an
ambiguity exists, we ‘examine extrinsic evidence’” (quoting Yogman , 325 Or. at
363)).
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erly understood does not bar its admission.9  Something like the




In part, the parol evidence rule is so “dark and difficult” for us
all because, amazingly, there exists even today no definitive
statement of the rule.  One can try to cobble together such a
statement from sections 209 through 217 of Restatement Second,
or try to untangle U.C.C. section 2-202, but in general one hunts
far and wide without success for anything very helpful either to a
first-year law student or to a court.10  Nor can one find anywhere
a clear, authoritative standard for resolving any of the various
issues typically arising in a parol-evidence dispute: (1) whether a
written contract is “integrated”; (2) if so, whether it’s integrated
“completely” or only “partially”; (3) whether the disputed parol
evidence is “consistent” with the writing; (4) whether the so-
called “fraud exception” applies; and so forth.
At a slightly deeper level, all this darkness and difficulty surely
result from the fact that the parol evidence rule creates so fre-
quently the fundamental tension existing throughout contract
law, and perhaps beyond: the tension between (1) clear rules of
general, predictable application and (2) equitable, common-sense
results in particular cases.  The important goal of allowing parties
to rely on their written words as final and complete conflicts in-
evitably in parol-evidence disputes with the equally if not more
fundamental goal of assuring parties that a court will enforce the
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (1981); Abercrombie , 325 Or. at
291, 883 P.2d at 853 (stating that the rule “does not prohibit a party from introducing
evidence extrinsic to a writing to explain an ambiguity . . . .”); State v. Triad Mech.,
Inc., 144 Or. App. 106, 113, 925 P.2d 918, 922 (1996) (same); CORBIN, supra  note 4,
at §§ 412-31; Sweet, supra  note 3, at 1041.  Even ORS 41.740, Oregon’s restrictive
1862 statutory version of the rule, states that it “does not exclude . . . evidence . . . to
explain an ambiguity, intrinsic or extrinsic.”
10 For me, the most useful summary formulation of the rule remains Chief Justice
Traynor’s in Masterson v. Sine , 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968):
When the parties to a written contract have agreed to it as an “integra-
tion”—a complete and final embodiment of the terms of an agreement—
parol evidence cannot be used to add to or vary its terms . . . . When only
part of the agreement is integrated, the same rule applies to that part, but
parol evidence may be used to prove elements of the agreement not re-
duced to writing.
Id.  at 563 (citations omitted).
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terms to which they actually agreed.  Currently, in Oregon and
elsewhere, these conflicts result all too often in perplexing legal
uncertainty, evident injustice, or both.
A. Uncertainty
This part of the argument will be familiar to you, and perhaps
even noncontroversial.  It’s hardly a secret that for a very long
time parol evidence rule decisions, both nationally and in our
own state, have seemed to many observers strikingly inconsistent
and at times downright confusing.
Professor Eric Posner has summarized the national disarray as
follows: “In virtually every jurisdiction, one finds irreconcilable
cases, frequent changes in doctrine, confusion, and cries of de-
spair.”11  Others have documented such uncertainty and despair
in various individual states, including Alaska, California, Illinois,
Montana, Texas, and Wisconsin.12
The situation in Oregon is not dissimilar.  Your able predeces-
sors a generation ago tried hard, in Hatley v. Stafford ,13 to make
a new, more certain beginning on the rule.  They succeeded ad-
11 Posner, supra  note 4, at 540; see also  Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence
Rule:  Promissory Estoppel’s Next Conquest? , 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1403 (1983)
(“Commentators frequently have assailed the inconsistency typifying the parol evi-
dence rule’s application and the confusion and disagreement about its underlying
policy foundations . . . . [The rule] encourages litigation, ‘adversely affects both the
counseling of clients and the litigation process,’ and hurts the administration of jus-
tice.”) (citations omitted).
12 See generally  Leonard Marinaccio, III, Note, Out on Parol?:  A Critical Exami-
nation of the Alaska Supreme Court’s Application of the Parol Evidence Rule , 11
ALASKA L. REV. 405, 405 (1994) (“imprecision and confusion” have “plagued” Alas-
kan applications of the rule); Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There
is a Parol Evidence Rule in California—The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory , 25 SW. U.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) (California courts face “persistent and intractable problems in
the application of the parol evidence rule”); Marie Adornetto Monahan, The Disa-
greement Over Agreements:  The Conflict in Illinois Regarding the Parol Evidence
Rule and Contract Interpretation , 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 687, 688 (2003) (Illinois parol-
evidence decisions have been “in conflict since 1976”); Scott J. Burnham, The Parol
Evidence Rule:  Don’t Be Afraid of the Dark , 55 MONT. L. REV. 93, 95, 98 (1994)
(the Montana Supreme Court has been “notoriously inconsistent” in its treatment of
the rule, creating a “great deal of misunderstanding”); David R. Dow, The Confused
State of the Parol Evidence Rule in Texas , 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 457, 458 (1994) (Texas
decisions suffer from “a great deal of confusion”); Michael A. Lawrence, Comment,
The Parol Evidence Rule in Wisconsin:  Status in the Law of Contract, Revisited , 1991
WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1079 (“pervasive uncertainty” concerning the rule exists in Wis-
consin and elsewhere).
13 284 Or. 523, 588 P.2d 603 (1978).
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mirably to a point,14 but in truth the majority opinion in Hatley
was itself too inconsistent, and too wedded to Professor Willis-
ton’s classical worldview,15 to serve as a durable new beginning.
Barely a decade later, for example, a Court of Appeals panel re-
marked that Hatley  achieved its greater-certainty goal only if
read quite “carelessly.”16
Recent Oregon trial and appellate rulings have exhibited basic
disagreements among justices and judges themselves over parol
evidence rule applications.  In Deerfield Commodities, Ltd. v.
Nerco, Inc. ,17 for example, a divided Court of Appeals panel re-
versed a trial court decision admitting parol evidence of a buyer’s
precontractual assurances, thereby also reversing the plaintiff
seller’s $27,000,000 jury verdict.  And in Abercrombie v. Hayden
Corp. ,18 the Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling (af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals) admitting evidence that a real
estate seller had orally extended the closing date.  Once again,
that ruling also reversed the plaintiff’s multimillion-dollar jury
14 Hatley ’s virtues include (1) a creative, common-sense interpretation of ORS
41.740, Oregon’s statutory  parol evidence rule—see infra  note 20; (2) a helpful, real-
istic description of factors relevant to deciding whether parties intended a complete
rather than a partial integration; (3) a commendably broad conception of “consis-
tency,” one that allows more parol evidence to supplement a writing than do some
others; and (4) an obviously just result, compensating a tenant farmer for the wheat
crop he planted and grew.  However, the court also directed trial judges to “pre-
sume” that parties intended any writing to be a complete integration–a direction
that certainly contradicts the “softer” innovations elsewhere in the opinion.
15 For explanations of what legal historians and others mean by a “classical
worldview” in law, see, for example, WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1998); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977) (“The Age of Faith”); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 9-31 (1992) (“The Structure of
Classical Legal Thought”). In one sentence, the classical worldview that dominated
late 19th and early 20th century American law was one that (1) emphasized system-
atic, generalized legal “rules” and (2) sought greater legal “certainty” by characteriz-
ing issues whenever possible as legal, for the court, rather than factual, for the jury.
In contract law, Professor Williston was the leading exemplar of this worldview, in-
cluding his favored “hard” version of the parol evidence rule. See generally  WILLIS-
TON, supra  note 4.
16 Hatley v. Stafford . . . sets as its goal clarification of the [parol evidence
rule] confusion.  Unfortunately, the case only achieves that goal if it is read
carelessly.  When it is read carefully, it is not particularly clear and is by no
means as helpful as the frequency of its citation would suggest.
O’Meara v. Pritchett, 97 Or. App. 329, 334, 776 P.2d 866, 867 (1989).
17 72 Or. App. 305, 696 P.2d 1096 (1985); see also infra  text accompanying notes
26-30.
18 320 Or. 279, 883 P.2d 845 (1994).
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verdict.19
Moreover, sharply worded disagreements regarding the parol
evidence rule appear occasionally even within the same court.
Justice Lent dissented from Hatley , for example, urging that the
majority’s ruling rendered ORS 41.740 “meaningless.”20  Judge
Rossman dissented from Deerfield Commodities , believing that
the trial court should have admitted the abundant evidence of
the buyer’s “fraudulent representations,” at least under the
“fraud exception” to the rule.21  Judge Warren dissented in Leitz
v. Thorson ,22 disagreeing emphatically with (1) the majority’s ad-
dressing the “integration” issue before the “consistency” issue
and (2) its conclusion that the parol term was consistent with the
written lease.23  Finally, Judge Armstrong dissented in State v.
Triad Mechanical, Inc. ,24 urging that the majority was “wrong” to
19 If you wonder how the Abercrombie  court managed to apply the parol evidence
rule to a postcontractual  conversation, the explanation is that it decided to postdate
escrowed quitclaim deeds from the date they were executed to the date they were
recorded.  Fortunately, the significance of that  sketchy maneuver seems likely con-
fined to the Abercrombie  facts.
20 284 Or. 523, 536, 588 P.2d 603, 610 (Lent, J., dissenting).  ORS 41.740, enacted
in 1862, states in part, “When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing by the parties, it is to be considered as containing all those terms, and there-
fore there can be . . . no evidence of the terms . . . other than the contents of the
writing . . . .”
As the Hatley  majority noted, literal enforcement of this ultra-hard-line version of
the parol evidence rule would exclude virtually all parol relating to any written
agreement.  To avoid such unfortunate literalism, the court interpreted the legisla-
tive intent as being simply to codify the (evolving) common law rule. Hatley , 284
Or. at 527 & n.1, 588 P.2d at 605 & n.1.  As authority for that view, or at least as an
example, the court cited Masterson v. Sine , 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), the landmark
California decision a decade earlier interpreting that state’s identical statute identi-
cally. See also supra  note 10.
21 72 Or. App. 305, 331, 696 P.2d 1096, 1113 (1992) (Rossman, J., dissenting).
22 113 Or. App. 557, 562, 833 P.2d 343, 346 (1992) (Warren, J., dissenting).  In
Leitz , the plaintiffs leased space from the defendant to open a florist shop, then
learned later that the Deschutes County Code prohibited their placing a freestand-
ing sign on the adjacent highway.  The written lease prohibited the tenant from er-
ecting a sign without the landlord’s prior written consent, but the plaintiffs alleged a
prior oral promise by the defendant that they could in fact erect a freestanding sign.
The trial court ruled that the lease was only partially integrated, that the parol term
was “not inconsistent” with it, and that the defendant therefore had breached the
lease by failing to provide a lawful sign location.
The Court of Appeals affirmed 2-1.  Judge Warren, in dissent, accused the majority
of sanctioning an analytical methodology that “cannot be correct” and of “trudg[ing]
on to conclude that patently inconsistent terms are consistent.” Id.  at 564, 833 P.2d
at 347.
23 Id.  at 563-65, 833 P.2d at 346-47.
24 144 Or. App. 106, 119, 925 P.2d 918, 925 (1996) (Armstrong, J., dissenting).  For
a brief description of Triad ’s facts, see infra  text accompanying notes 34-35.
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bar evidence of the parties’ discussions held prior to signing two
change orders.25
In short, it seems not unfair to conclude that the current condi-
tion of parol evidence rule jurisprudence in our state, as in most
states, is considerably variable and uncertain even to its most as-
tute observers, the judiciary.
B. Injustice
Even worse than the judicial conflicts and resulting uncertainty
are the several recent examples of evident injustice in parol evi-
dence rule cases.  A clear such example, surely, was the Deerfield
Commodities  decision mentioned above,26 where a written multi-
million-dollar coal silt contract stated that the seller would be
subject to price penalties for silt delivered with moisture content
exceeding 7%.  The seller offered to prove (1) repeated oral as-
surances by the buyer that the penalty threshold in fact would be
12%  and (2) the buyer’s precontractual explanation that the
written contract could not be altered to reflect the true 12% fig-
ure because of certain Korean government procurement specifi-
cations.27  The writing also contained a merger clause.28
When the buyer later enforced the written 7% penalty thresh-
old, the seller sued and won a $27,000,000 jury verdict.  However,
a Court of Appeals majority reversed, ruling that the trial court
had erred in admitting evidence of the repeated oral assurances
and explanation.  It stated, virtually without discussion, that (1)
the parties had “meant” what the merger clause stated, so the
writing was “fully integrated”; (2) the 12% oral assurances could
not be admitted even as interpretive evidence because they “con-
tradicted” the written 7% threshold; and (3) applying Penn-
sylvania law, the assurances also were inadmissible under the
25 For one more vigorous dissent in a parol evidence rule case, see Sternes v.
Tucker , 239 Or. 105, 114-15, 395 P.2d 881, 886 (1964) (Rossman, J., dissenting) (by
the majority’s affirming an exclusion of parol evidence “the plaintiff is deprived of
trial by jury”).
26 See supra  note 17 and accompanying text.
27 72 Or. App. 305, 311-12, 696 P.2d 1096, 1101-02 (1985).
28 “This document contains the entire agreement between the parties and . . .
[t]here are no other understandings, representations or agreements between the par-
ties.” Id.  at 309, 696 P.2d at 1100.  Because the Deerfield Commodities  contract was
for a sale of goods, coal silt, U.C.C. Article 2 applied to it.  However, there is pre-
cious little difference between the common law parol evidence rule and its Code
counterpart—see OR. REV. STAT. § 72.2020—and, in any event, the Deerfield Com-
modities  court noted none.
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fraud exception, again because they contradicted the writing.29
Judge Rossman dissented, pointing out that the record was “full
of testimony” that the two sides actually had agreed to the 12%
threshold; and urging that therefore evidence of that agreement
surely was admissible, at least as proof of fraud.30
Similarly, in Howell v. Oregonian Publishing Co. ,31 the news-
paper had distributed papers for many years through a “dealer-
ship system” under which individual dealers would purchase
papers for resale to subscribers and others.  Over time, the deal-
erships became quite valuable, some being purchased for as
much as $150,000.  Nothing in the newspaper’s standard written
dealership contract gave either party a right to renew, but news-
paper personnel had “consistently represented” to the dealers
that it would continue to renew contracts of all dealers who “per-
formed adequately.”32  In 1982, however, newspaper manage-
ment decided to switch to an in-house “agency” distribution
system, so it declined to renew any dealer contracts thereafter.
In the dealers’ action for contract breach and fraud, the trial
court excluded all evidence of the newspaper’s representations
and granted the paper summary judgment.  The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed that ruling, asserting that the representations “di-
rectly contradict[ed]” the written term that neither party had a
“right to insist on renewal.”33
Well, perhaps, but surely some readers will remain uncon-
vinced.  Query whether a right to renew dependent on a dealer’s
having “performed adequately” necessarily contradicts the lack
of an unqualified  right to renew.  I myself think it does not:
neither the plain meaning of the language nor plain old common
sense seems to me to support such a restrictive conclusion.
29 72 Or. App. at 325, 328, 626 P.2d at 1109-11.  The trial judge himself had over-
turned much of the large jury verdict by granting the buyer a new trial on the dam-
ages issue, limiting the contract’s duration to one year rather than five as the jury
had found.
30 Id.  at 331-32, 626 P.2d at 1113-14 (Rossman, J., dissenting).
31 Howell v. Oregonian Publ’g Co. (Howell I), 82 Or. App. 241, 728 P.2d 106
(1986).
32 Id.  at 243, 728 P.2d at 107.
33 Id. at 243, 728 P.2d at 107. The court reversed the newspaper’s summary judg-
ment on the fraud claim, noting that proof of fraud “is not prohibited by the parol
evidence rule.” Id. at 246-47, 728 P.2d at 109.  It also reversed the paper’s judgment
on contract breach itself, noting there remained a question whether the parties had
orally modified  their written agreements.  On reconsideration, however, it con-
cluded that the dealers had waived that theory.  Howell v. Oregonian Publ’g Co.
(Howell II), 85 Or. App. 84, 735 P.2d 659 (1987).
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Moreover, and most important, it is clear even from the court’s
opinion that the plaintiff dealers received far less than the justice
to which our Oregon legal system long has been committed.
Finally, in State v. Triad Mechanical, Inc. ,34 the Oregon De-
partment of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) hired Triad to construct
improvements to a fish hatchery.  The contract included (1) a
335-day completion period and (2) a term requiring a change or-
der for any rock excavation exceeding 100 cubic yards.  When
Triad encountered more than 100 cubic yards of rock, the parties
agreed to two written change orders setting forth a “fixed unit
price” for the increased excavation itself.  However, according to
Triad personnel, the parties explicitly postponed at that time con-
sidering any additional “delay and impact costs” resulting from
the extra work because they could not then estimate those costs
accurately; they agreed instead that Triad would submit a sepa-
rate claim for them at the project’s end.35
Triad did submit such a separate claim later, but the State de-
nied it, and Triad sued.  Applying the parol evidence rule, the
trial court excluded all Triad’s evidence of the agreement regard-
ing a later claim.36  A Court of Appeals panel majority affirmed,
reasoning that (1) each change order constituted a “complete in-
tegration” because it would not have been “natural” for the par-
ties to have omitted an agreement regarding a later claim from
such an order; and (2) in any event, such an oral agreement was
“inconsistent” with change-order language that the orders them-
selves would not extend the original 335-day completion
schedule.37
My goodness!  The contractors I represented in private prac-
tice would be surprised, if not shocked, to hear that by signing a
change order compensating for additional direct expense they in-
tended to negate a simultaneous oral agreement regarding a later
supplemental claim.  Or to hear that it’s somehow “not natural”
on a jobsite for an owner and a contractor to reach partial agree-
ment on some matter midway through a project, leaving an un-
quantifiable remainder for later determination.  Or, even more,
34 144 Or. App. 106, 925 P.2d 918 (1996).
35 Id.  at 110 & n.2, 925 P.2d at 920 & n.2.
36 The trial court ruled, alternatively, that each change order constituted an “ac-
cord and satisfaction,” another ruling that seems most puzzling given that no dispute
existed at those times to be settled by any “accord.”  The Court of Appeals had no
need to address that ruling, and did not.
37 Id.  at 117-18, 925 P.2d at 924-25.
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to hear that an agreement regarding a future possible pay in-
crease and time extension is fatally “inconsistent” with a recital
that two signed change orders themselves  will not extend the
completion date!
Admittedly, I know not whether the ODFW representative in
fact agreed that Triad could submit a later, supplemental claim.
However, as Judge Armstrong urged in dissent, the majority’s
parol-evidence ruling precluded Triad from even attempting to
prove its claim.  Assume for a moment that the State did  author-
ize a later, supplemental claim; then imagine the anger and cyni-
cism such an exclusionary parol-evidence ruling creates among




All right.  If you’re still reading, no doubt you’re asking some-
thing like, “Well, even assuming a ‘softer’ parol evidence rule
would reduce both uncertainty and injustice in Oregon contract
litigation, how exactly might we move toward such a rule?”  I
intend to offer here three possibilities, taken principally from ac-
ademic literature, and suggest eventually that you adopt the
third, the one closest to existing precedent in Oregon and
elsewhere.
Nearly all advocates of reforming the parol evidence rule,
teachers and judges alike, begin by reminding readers that the
principal goal of contract interpretation is and should be to en-
force the parties’ actual agreement.  William Hale, for example,
the University of Oregon law dean nearly a century ago, ex-
pressed this well: in any “contractual controversy,” a court’s “real
quest is for the terms of the bargain.”38  More recently, Professor
Corbin expressed the same fundamental idea: “The cardinal rule
with which all interpretation begins is that its purpose is to ascer-
tain the intention of the parties.”39  If we all can agree on that
first principle, the reform question becomes simply, how can we
38 Hale, supra  note 1, at 121.
39 Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule , 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 162 (1965). See generally CORBIN, supra  note 4; John E. Mur-
ray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts , 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342, 1348 (1975) (“Some
commentators strongly urge a test that would emphasize the actual intention of the
parties.”).
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best ascertain such intention in cases involving both a written
contract and an alleged prior oral agreement?  Here are three
“softer” possibilities.
A. Abolish the Rule Altogether
One quite revolutionary idea would be simply to abolish the
parol evidence rule altogether, as Professor Corbin urged from
time to time:
It would have been better had no such rule ever been stated as
a rule preventing the introduction of testimony.  Instead, at-
tention should be called to the accepted rule that parties can
by a substituted contract discharge and annul any and all of
their previously made contracts.  The question may then be
put: Have the parties in the instant case made such a substi-
tuted contract?  On this issue of fact, no relevant testimony
should be excluded . . . .40
Professor Murray has explained the principal implications of
such a reform:
[It] would eschew any evidentiary gloss and have the court fo-
cus upon two questions: Was the extrinsic agreement made?
Did the parties intend to nullify that agreement by their subse-
quent writing? . . . The application of this test requires no “pa-
rol evidence rule.”  It emphasizes the actual intention of the
parties rather than the fictitious problem of whether parties
might naturally and normally include the alleged extrinsic
matter in the writing.41
Those urging this abolitionist position naturally express greater
confidence in juries than do believers in a “harder” parol evi-
dence rule.  They point out that in many other contexts our legal
system relies routinely on juries to make important, sometimes
difficult fact determinations.  So why, they ask, should we trust
juries less in the context of a partly oral and partly written con-
tract?  Boalt Hall Professor Justin Sweet, for example, asked,
“Our system allocates to the jury the function of determining
credibility of witnesses . . . . What makes parol evidence cases
more difficult for the jury than construction accidents, consumer
40 Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule , 53 YALE L.J. 603, 631-32 (1944);
see also  CORBIN, supra  note 4.  Recently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted Article 8(3) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods as a “rejection of the parol evidence rule” for contracts
that it governs.  MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, 144
F.3d 1384, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998).
41 Murray, supra  note 39, at 1348.
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injuries or gift tax cases?”42
Realistically, however, I suppose it’s unlikely today that any
American state supreme court will abolish the parol evidence
rule altogether within its jurisdiction.  This seems especially true
in a state like Oregon, where a decidedly “hard” version of the
rule remains embedded in an old statute.  Moreover, on the mer-
its, even many critics of the rule concede it serves a useful pur-
pose in some  transactions.  So, following are a couple further
reform possibilities.
B. Create A Rebuttable Presumption
What about simply creating a rebuttable presumption that a
writing represents the parties’ complete, integrated agreement,
but in all cases allowing the proponent of parol evidence to intro-
duce it “for what it’s worth” (as California trial judges used to
say to me)?  Dean Hale was among the early advocates of such a
reform:
The basic evils of the rule in its present form are, first, that it is
a pretense, and second, that the collateral inquiries which arise
whenever it confronts the court are artificial, capricious and
arbitrary.
The cure.  Let the parol evidence rule be phrased and operate
as a rule of presumption.  When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing by the parties, let it be presumed
that the writing contains with exactness and completeness all
those terms, but allow this presumption to be overcome by
clear and convincing proof to the contrary.43
Several modern commentators have cited this “presumption”
idea favorably,44 and I myself believe it’s an idea whose time
someday will come.  It is simple; it would respond meaningfully
to the persistent academic and judicial criticism of the parol evi-
dence rule; it would signal again the legal system’s confidence in
juries to decide contract cases as well as they decide others; and
to most drafters and defenders of written contracts, it would be
42 Sweet, supra  note 3, at 1055; see also  Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evi-
dence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury , 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932);
Murray, supra  note 6, at 344 (“It is the intrusion of the trial judge on the traditional
province of the jury which is the parol evidence rule in action.”).
43 Hale, supra  note 1, at 122.  Dean Hale found his principal model for this “solu-
tion of the parol evidence problem” in equity principles governing reformation of
instruments for mistake. Id.
44 E.g. , McCormick, supra  note 42, at 366; Corbin, supra  note 40, at 629.
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less troubling than the more revolutionary possibility of abolish-
ing the parol evidence rule altogether.
Again, however, this second possible reform—substituting a
mere presumption for the all-too-frequent absolute bar—may
seem to Your Honors a little too far from today’s mainstream.
Therefore, I’ll propose to you instead a third, more modest re-
form, one that hews closer to existing law both nationally and in
our own state.  It consists simply of a logical ordering of the typi-
cal issues in a parol evidence rule dispute, together with sug-
gested guidelines or standards for resolving those issues.
C. A More Modest Proposal
To begin, we need to consider the kind of transaction in which
the parol evidence rule’s exclusionary effect does make sense at
times.  Surely it is a large, commercially sophisticated transac-
tion—say, a corporate merger—in which experienced parties and
able counsel have negotiated, drafted, and redrafted a lengthy
written contract, and both sides understood and agreed that only
terms contained in that writing would be enforceable.45
We’ve all seen these: two or more teams of attorneys meeting
in a walnut-paneled conference room overlooking the Willamette
River, saying to each other something like, “O.K., this is it,
right?”  “Right.”  “We agree this is our entire deal?”  “Abso-
lutely.”  “Then let’s both initial the merger clause in paragraph
33, just to be on the safe side.”  “Sure, no problem.  By the way,
how’s the new granddaughter?”
My own personal view of the parol evidence rule, after 35
years of first litigating about it then later reading and teaching
about it, is that courts should restrict the rule’s operation to pre-
cisely this kind of transaction.  As Professor Sweet wrote in 1968,
“The only proper function of the parol evidence rule is to protect
truly integrated writings.”46  And it is only where both parties
45 Professor Sweet expressed this same rather obvious thought nearly four de-
cades ago.  “The hallmark of a truly integrated contract is that it is put together
carefully and methodically.  In this sense it resembles the creation of a statute or a
treaty.”  Sweet, supra  note 3, at 1063.
46 Id.  at 1036.  Sweet’s somewhat fuller statement of the same point is as follows:
If the rule must be lived with, it should be limited to a generally accepted
and desirable objective—the protection of truly integrated writings.  If the
parol evidence rule is limited solely to protecting integrated agreements,
many difficult parol evidence issues and subissues will disappear.  There
will be no need to wrestle with consistent collateral agreements, oral condi-
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plainly understood the legal implication of omitting an agreed
term from their writing that the commendable goal of “commer-
cial certainty” truly outweighs the competing, even more funda-
mental goal of enforcing all terms to which the parties actually
agreed.
This third, most modest path toward achieving a “softer” parol
evidence rule, one confined largely to the foregoing paradigm
transactions, is not difficult to chart.  There are, after all, only
three fundamental issues in most parol-evidence disputes, and
only two are particularly important.
1. Is the Writing Integrated at All?
The first issue in nearly any such dispute is—or at least should
be—whether the rule applies at all.  Every well-considered for-
mulation of the parol evidence rule, whether judicial or aca-
demic, begins something like this: “When parties to a written
contract intended their writing to constitute a final expression of
all or part of their agreement, . . . .”47  As the Hatley  court wrote,
“The fact that a writing exists does not bring the rule into play if
the parties do not intend the writing to embody their final agree-
ment.”48  The point is, a party seeking to invoke the parol evi-
dence rule should have to produce something more than a mere
writing; it should be required to establish a quite special kind of
writing, one that both parties intended would supercede, i.e.,
erase , some or all of what preceded it.
Curiously, even though courts repeat this foundational princi-
ple consistently, they almost never apply it, or even consider ap-
plying it.  In only the rarest of cases does a trial or appellate court
require actual proof of party intent to “integrate” their agree-
ment—that is, to do something more than simply write down
tions, oral delivery, fraud, sham, true consideration and the like as devices
to avoid the rule.
Id.  at 1059-60; see also  9 WIGMORE, supra  note 3, at § 2425.
47 E.g. , formulation quoted from Master v. Sine, supra note 10; see also, e.g., State
v. Triad Mech., Inc., 144 Or. App. 106, 114, 925 P.2d 918, 922 (1996) (“In analyzing a
parol evidence rule issue, we must determine whether the agreement the parties
have reduced to writing is integrated and, if so, to what extent.”); U.C.C. § 2-202
(1977) (stating that the rule applies to a “writing intended by the parties as a final
expression”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (1981) (stating that pa-
rol evidence is always admissible to establish “that the writing is or is not an inte-
grated  agreement”).
48 Hatley v. Stafford, 284 Or. 523, 527, 588 P.2d 603, 605 (1978). See generally
CORBIN, supra  note 4, § 573, at 357; WILLISTON, supra  note 4, § 633, at 1225.
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some or all the agreed terms.49  Nearly always, they simply as-
sume that the disputed writing constitutes an integration, at least
in part.
I hope, once before I die, to read about an Oregon court ask-
ing an attorney seeking to exclude testimony by means of the
parol evidence rule, “Counsel, have you any evidence that these
parties actually intended their writing to integrate  their agree-
ment—that is, to supercede and erase prior conversations and
writings?  Did the parties, for example, have a conversation  to
that effect?”
Requiring such evidence of genuine intent to integrate, as a
condition of applying the parol evidence rule at all, would dis-
pose quickly of many disputes about the rule.  It also would help
immeasurably confine the rule within its legitimate sphere, the
world described above of sophisticated, negotiated written con-
tracts that parties truly did intend to “integrate.”  Most impor-
tant, requiring such proof as a condition of applying the rule
would help insure that cases like Deerfield Commodities , Howell ,
and Triad Mechanical  would be decided not on a technicality but
on the merits of whether the defendants in those cases actually
made the promises the plaintiffs alleged they did.50
2. If Integrated at All, Is the Writing a Complete or Only a
Partial Integration?
Because so few courts examine seriously the first, “integrated
at all” issue, this is actually the first crucial question in most parol
evidence rule disputes.  If a court declares a writing to be a com-
plete  integration—a final and exclusive  statement of the parties’
agreement—very little parol evidence is admissible;51 if only a
49 The standard Oregon citation to such a rare case is National Cash Register Co.
v. I.M.C., Inc. , 260 Or. 504, 491 P.2d 211 (1971).  Following an oral month-to-month
equipment lease and the lessee’s signing an incomplete form, the lessor completed
the form by inserting a one-year lease term.  The lessor then contended that the
parol evidence rule barred proof of the month-to-month agreement, but both the
trial and appellate courts concluded that the parties “did not agree to an integration
of that oral agreement into a written lease agreement.” Id.  at 509, 491 P.2d at 214.
50 See supra  text accompanying notes 26-37.
51 Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 214 sets forth the general rule, in
Oregon and elsewhere, that even a complete integration does not preclude (1) evi-
dence to interpret a written term or (2) evidence of illegality, fraud, duress, mistake,
or “other invalidating cause.”  Section 217 then adds a similar exception to the rule
for evidence of a condition precedent to the writing’s effectiveness. See, e.g. , Rob-
erts v. Maze, 116 Or. App. 441, 443, 985 P.2d 211, 212 (1999) (evidence that the
writing was a “sham” admissible); Pendleton Grain Growers v. Pedro, 271 Or. 24,
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partial  integration, evidence of “consistent additional terms” also
may reach the trier of fact.52
To begin with, it is vitally important to any reform of Oregon’s
parol evidence rule that you abandon explicitly the presumption
from Hatley v. Stafford53 that parties intended any  writing “com-
plete on its face” to be a complete integration.  With respect, that
presumption is seriously unrealistic, misleading in most cases,
and a potential source of considerable injustice.  It also is con-
trary to the position adopted by drafters and promulgators of the
Uniform Commercial Code.54
Indeed, the presumption, if any, should be quite the reverse.
A party contending that a writing constitutes a complete integra-
tion, i.e., that both parties agreed consciously to abandon all
prior understandings and agreements, should bear at least the
burden of persuasion on that issue.  That party, after all, is at-
tempting to exclude from any consideration whatsoever evidence
even of a consistent additional term.  Personally, I would prefer
that such a party be required to demonstrate a complete integra-
tion by “clear and convincing evidence,” but, in any event, it cer-
tainly seems clear that the current presumption in that party’s
favor  should cease to exist.
The Restatement criterion for a partial rather than complete
integration is whether the parol term is one that “in the circum-
stances might naturally be omitted from the writing.”55  For ex-
ample, the Hatley  court concluded that the parties there might
naturally have omitted from their informal written lease a time
limit on the lessor’s buyout right.56
Some have criticized the Restatement criterion as too restric-
tive, too susceptible to abuse by parties claiming complete inte-
29, 530 P.2d 85, 88 (1975) (evidence of condition precedent admissible). But see
Sternes v. Tucker, 239 Or. 105, 395 P.2d 881 (1964) (evidence of condition precedent
not  admissible).
52 See, e.g. , Triad Mech. , 144 Or. App. at 113, 925 P.2d at 922; Siegner v. Interstate
Prod. Credit Ass’n, 109 Or. App. 417, 425, 820 P.2d 20, 25 (1991).
53 284 Or. at 535, 588 P.2d at 609.
54 U.C.C. section 2-202, comment 1 expressly “rejects any assumption” that a writ-
ing constitutes a complete integration.
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(2)(b) (1981).  The comparable
U.C.C. Article 2 criterion is similar, though somewhat “softer”:  a writing will be
deemed a complete integration only if the disputed parol term “certainly” would
have been included in the writing if actually agreed to.  U.C.C.  § 2-202 cmt. 3
(1977).  This more parol-friendly “certainly” criterion seems actually quite close to
my own suggestion of a presumption against  complete integration.
56 284 Or. at 535-36, 588 P.2d at 609-10.
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grations.  Professor Corbin, for example, objected to it as long
ago as 1944, characterizing it as an unwise, artificial barrier
against truth telling.  In his view, the dispositive question should
not be whether persons might “naturally” have omitted a particu-
lar term from their writing; instead, it should be whether the par-
ties then before the court in fact did  so.  That more particular
inquiry raises simply a “question of weight of evidence and of
probability of truth; it is a question of fact.”  And the correct way
to proceed, according to Corbin, is to conduct that inquiry like
any other, to admit all relevant evidence and simply treat the
“flimsy and improbable” as flimsy and improbable.57
In my own view, however, you need not abandon altogether
the Restatement’s well-established “naturally” criterion in order
to make progress on this critical second issue.  Rather, the impor-
tant thing is to encourage Oregon courts to apply it, or any other
test or criterion, as realistically to individual disputes as did your
predecessors in Hatley .58  Professor Justin Sweet suggested, for
example, that a court faced with a degree-of-integration issue
consider a series of “key facts” that likely will be helpful: (1) sub-
ject matter of the transaction, (2) length of the negotiations, (3)
the parties’ business experience, (4) extent of any participation
by counsel, (5) degree of standardization of the writing, and (6)
presence or absence of a merger clause.59
Moreover, once again the benefit of any plausible doubt on
this issue should belong to the party seeking to introduce parol,
seeking a trial on the merits of a claim, rather than to the party
attempting to avoid such a trial.  After all, the introducing party
almost certainly will be the less commercially and legally sophis-
ticated, as well as far less likely to have consulted an attorney
before signing.
A persistent, troublesome question within this second issue is
what weight to give a written “merger” or “integration” clause:
for example, “This writing constitutes the final and exclusive
statement of the parties’ agreement with respect to its subject
matter.”  Such clauses appear all too frequently in written con-
tracts today60—sometimes negotiated, understood, and agreed to
57 Corbin, supra  note 40, at 642; see also  Murray, supra  note 39, at 1366-69 (criti-
cizing the “might naturally” test, primarily for logical inconsistencies created when
juxtaposing it against other Restatement sections).
58 See supra  notes 13-14, 48, and accompanying text.
59 Sweet, supra  note 3, at 1064-66.
60 See, e.g. , discussion of Deerfield Commodities , supra  notes 26-30 and accompa-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 19 28-NOV-05 13:21
A Friendly Letter 387
by both parties, but very often not.
Some courts are understandably tempted to accept a merger
clause at face value, thereby making it determinative on the cru-
cial degree-of-integration issue.  In Oregon, happily, ample au-
thority exists for the proposition—endorsed by Restatement
Second—that such a clause is not  determinative on this issue.61
What remains for Your Honors to do here is only to reiterate and
emphasize that important principle.
A trial court should inquire searchingly into the factual back-
ground of each merger clause it encounters rather than simply
accepting it as face-value truth.  Again, an appropriate question
would be, “Counsel, what evidence do you have that both parties
actually understood and agreed to this crucial term?”  If the at-
torney seeking to exclude evidence even of a consistent addi-
tional term can establish such understanding and agreement,
then of course the court should enforce the merger clause, as it
would any other term to which the parties actually agreed.  If,
however, as is more generally true, one or both parties did not
read the clause, did not understand it, or had no realistic choice
with respect to it, the court should declare it to be unenforceable
boilerplate,62 admit the consistent additional parol terms, and
proceed to try the claim on its true merits.
So, in sum, Your Honors need do nothing very revolutionary
on this important degree-of-integration issue to “soften” Ore-
gon’s parol evidence rule appropriately.  You need only (1) aban-
don the unrealistic presumption from Hatley v. Stafford  that a
written contract is completely integrated; and (2) endorse once
again the Restatement’s “naturally” test, but recognize explicitly
for the future that in fact relatively few contracting parties truly
understand and agree to complete integrations.  Because so few
parties actually do form a specific intent that a writing will negate
every prior conversation, promise, or agreement, a party assert-
ing such specific intent should have to establish it.
nying text; Siegner v. Interstate Prod. Credit Ass’n, 109 Or. App. 417, 820 P.2d 20
(1991).
61 Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 209, comment b states that a merger
clause “may not be conclusive” on the degree-of-integration issue.  For Oregon law
to the same effect, see, for example, Howell v. Oregonian Publ’g Co. , 82 Or. App.
241, 245, 728 P.2d 106, 108 (1968); State v. Triad Mech., Inc. , 144 Or. App. 106, 115,
925 P.2d 918, 923 (1996); Siegner , 109 Or. App. at 426, 820 P.2d at 26.
62 A merger clause, like any other, can be unconscionable. See generally  U.C.C.
§ 2-302 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); FARNS-
WORTH, supra  note 6, at 424 n.37.
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3. Is the Parol Evidence Consistent with the Writing?
This is the second of two critically important issues in much
parol evidence rule litigation.  If a court declares a writing to be
only partially rather than completely integrated, evidence of any
“consistent” additional term is admissible to supplement it.63
By and large, American courts have adopted one of two con-
trasting standards on the question whether parol evidence is con-
sistent with a writing.  The preferable one, surely, is the parol-
friendly standard announced by your predecessors in Hatley : a
parol term is consistent unless it contradicts directly “an express
provision in the writing.”64  In Hatley  itself, the oral 60-day time
limit on the lessor’s buyout right was consistent with the written
lease because the lease was silent regarding duration of that
right.65
Other courts, however, have adopted a considerably narrower
view of consistency, one that excludes far more parol even in par-
tial-integration cases.  A leading example we read occasionally in
Contracts class is Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Associates,
Inc. , where an owner attempted to prove an oral agreement be-
tween itself and a contractor that either party could cancel a car-
pet-installation contract at any time prior to performance.66  The
Maryland court excluded evidence of that agreement, partly be-
cause it was “inconsistent” with the written contract: there was,
in the court’s view, an “absence of reasonable harmony” between
the writing and the parol term.67
A second, more typical example of this narrower view appears
in Justice Burke’s dissent in Masterson v. Sine .68  Burke con-
tended that evidence of an oral nonassignability term “contra-
dicted” a written repurchase right that was silent as to
assignability.69  In other words, he seemed to say, if parol is in-
63 Abercrombie v. Hayden Corp., 320 Or. 279, 286-87, 883 P.2d 845, 850 (1994);
Hatley v. Stafford, 284 Or. 523, 535, 588 P.2d 603, 609 (1978); U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 (1981).
64 284 Or. at 533, 588 P.2d at 608-09.
65 The Hatley  court cited the leading midcentury authority for this parol-friendly
standard, Hunt Foods v. Doliner , 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (oral con-
dition precedent not inconsistent with written unconditional stock purchase option);
see also  Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (oral nonassignability term con-
sistent with written realty repurchase right that was silent as to assignability).
66 380 A.2d 618 (Md. App. 1977).
67 Id.  at 623.
68 436 P.2d at 567 (Burke, J., dissenting).
69 Id.
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consistent even with a writing’s legal implication , such as free as-
signability, it must be excluded.70
Even though Oregon courts generally have followed Hatley ’s
broader, preferable view of consistency in this context,71 it still
would be useful for Your Honors to reaffirm that view sometime
soon and, perhaps, to articulate an even more expansive state-
ment of it.
Consider again just for a moment the facts of Deerfield Com-
modities , where the court ruled, alternatively, that parol evidence
of an agreement to begin seller penalties at 12% moisture con-
tent was inconsistent with the written 7% threshold.72  This is in
fact a more interesting and difficult question than first appears.
At the surface, “12%” does seem inconsistent with “7%.”
However, on the relatively undisputed Deerfield Commodities
facts, perhaps the correct answer lay somewhere below the sur-
face.  According to the seller, the jury, and Judge Rossman in
dissent, the parties agreed  prior to signing the contract that the
written 7% figure would not be enforced and that the penalty
threshold instead would be 12%.73  To me at least, it does not
seem altogether inconsistent, or even particularly implausible in
Deerfield Commodities , that contracting parties would write one
thing but agree outside the writing they would be bound by
something else instead.
This point is analogous to Professor Corbin’s polite exception
taken to Justice Holmes’s famous dictum that a party should not
be allowed to prove a private agreement that “Bunker Hill Mon-
ument should signify Old South Church.”74  The “great judge was
in error,” Corbin wrote, because the risks of permitting such
70 Id. ; see also WILLISTON, supra  note 4, at 1238-39 (“Collateral Agreements Con-
tradicting an Implication of Law”).
71 See generally  Loverin v. Paulus, 160 Or. App. 605, 611, 982 P.2d 20, 24 (1999);
Leitz v. Thorson, 113 Or. App. 557, 561-62, 833 P.2d 343, 346 (1992).
72 Recall that the court ruled also, applying Pennsylvania law, that that same “in-
consistency” precluded admitting the parol agreement under the “fraud exception”
found in Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 214.  Of the several questiona-
ble conclusions reached by the Deerfield Commodities  court, that one seems (and
seemed to Judge Rossman) the most troubling.  If followed, it virtually would elimi-
nate the fraud exception altogether because, almost by definition, parol evidence
will contradict the writing when fraud is alleged.
73 Deerfield Commodities, Ltd. v. Nerco, Inc., 72 Or. App. 305, 696 P.2d 1096
(1985).
74 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation , 12 HARV. L.
REV. 417, 420 (1899).
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proof are “not so great as he feared.”75  One “must remember,”
he explained, “that a person asserting [such a claim] bears the
heavy risk of not being able to persuade the court and jury that it
is true.”76
The point, as always in a parol-evidence dispute, is that admit-
ting such evidence by no means insures that its proponent will
prevail on the asserted claim or defense.  It means simply that the
trier of fact will have an opportunity to hear that claim or de-
fense in its entirety and assess its truthfulness.  As Professor
Corbin observed so often, “The more bizarre and unusual an as-
serted interpretation is, the more convincing must be the testi-
mony that supports it.”  Naturally at some point a court should
“cease listening to testimony that white is black and . . . a dollar
is fifty cents,” but that point should be a “matter for sound judi-
cial discretion and common sense,” not one governed by an arti-
ficial “consistency” rule.77
4. Other, Miscellaneous Issues.
There are, of course, other parol evidence rule issues that arise
occasionally, such as the legitimate scope of the fraud excep-
tion;78 the meaning, if any, of the enigmatic “collateral agree-
ment” exception;79 and whether U.C.C. section 2-202 alters the
common law rule in any significant way for a sale-of-goods con-
tract.80  Again, however, I do not intend to burden either myself
or you with an exhaustive article examining all such issues.
Instead, I hope simply to convince you to “soften” Oregon’s
parol evidence rule by (1) reaffirming someday soon the funda-
75 Corbin, supra  note 40, at 624.
76 Id.  The Restatement now endorses Corbin’s view. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 illus. 4 (1981); see also  Sweet, supra  note 3, at 1041
(describing differing judicial treatments of such “private codes”).
77 Corbin, supra  note 40, at 623.
78 See, e.g. , Berry v. Richfield Oil Corp., 189 Or. 568, 220 P.2d 106 (1950) (evi-
dence of fraud inadmissible if it “directly conflicts” with the writing); Howell v. Ore-
gonian Publ’g Co., 85 Or. App. 84, 86, 735 P.2d 659, 660 (1987) (evidence of fraud
admissible even if it “directly contradicts” the writing).
79 For an introduction to this particular enigma, see FARNSWORTH, supra  note 6,
at 424-25.  Its difficulties include (1) whether a “collateral agreement” must be sup-
ported by separate consideration to be enforceable and (2) the admissibility of such
an agreement that contradicts the principal writing.
80 Probably not much, despite the drafters’ rather clear preference for a more
parol-friendly rule.  U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1 (1977) (rejecting any complete-integration
assumption); id.  cmt. 3 (the “certainty” test for complete integration)—see supra
note 55 and accompanying text .
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mental principle that a court’s first duty in a contract dispute is to
determine and enforce the parties’ actual agreement; and by (2)
analyzing parol evidence disputes in a way that generally will fa-
cilitate rather than hinder that task.  Is the writing truly inte-
grated?  If so, did both parties truly intend a complete rather
than partial integration?  And if merely partial, does the disputed
parol evidence truly contradict the writing in such a way that it
positively must be kept from the trier of fact?  To conclude by
repeating, I myself have believed for many years that such a re-
newed emphasis on the parties’ actual agreement, together with
the logical, common-sense approach to issues I’ve described
here, would contribute both to greater certainty in Oregon con-
tract litigation and to results in that litigation more consistent
with the ethical sense of our entire statewide community.
Thank you for reading.  Very best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
Jim Mooney
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 24 28-NOV-05 13:21
392 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
